

Latin America looking for its autonomy: The role of extra-hemispheric relations

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.53766/HumSur/2020.29.10>

Abstract

The general aim of this research is to analyze the role of extra-hemispheric relations in the autonomy of Latin America. The research is part of the Autonomy School and has a Critical perspective on International Relations. It is stated that the *different* autonomies, by the relation, by the integration, and by the diversification are interdependent. Although Latin America has geographically diversified its international relations, having a new dynamism the extra-hemispheric relations, they have had a limited impact on the autonomy of the region, due to the lack of coordination of a Latin American minimum Common Foreign Policy (CFP).

Keywords: Latin America; Autonomy; Extra-hemispheric relations; Global Order; Foreign policy.

América Latina en búsqueda de su autonomía: El rol de las relaciones extrahemisféricas

Resumen

El objetivo general de esta investigación es analizar el rol de las relaciones extrahemisféricas en la autonomía de América Latina. La investigación se enmarca dentro de la Escuela de la Autonomía y tiene una perspectiva crítica de las Relaciones Internacionales. Se afirma que las *distintas autonomías*, por la relación, por la integración y por la diversificación, son interdependientes. Si bien América Latina ha diversificado geográficamente sus relaciones internacionales, teniendo un nuevo dinamismo las relaciones extra-hemisféricas han tenido un impacto limitado en la autonomía de la región, debido a la falta de coordinación de una Política Exterior Común (PEC).

Palabras clave: América Latina; autonomía; relaciones extrahemisféricas; orden global; política exterior.

Recibido: 6.6.20 / Revisado: 15.6.20 / Aprobado: 1.7.20

1. Introduction

Latin America historically has had two great objectives at the international level, economic development, and autonomy in world politics. Associated with these two objectives there are significant and original intellectual traditions that reflect on these aspirations. In the looking for development, highlight the Structuralist School and the Dependency School. The first one, it is associated with Raúl Prebich and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), with emphasis on International Political Economy (IPE), and with fundamental categories such as *Centro - Periferia*; and the second one, in its variants includes authors such as André Gunder Frank and Theotonio Dos Santos, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Falleto, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Celso Furtado. And in the search for Autonomy in world politics, highlights the Autonomy School what has as pioneering representatives as Juan Carlos Puig and Helio Jaguaribe.

Of these three schools, the Autonomy school was the one with the least re-articulation, due to its lack of institutionalization and the material inability of the region to propose autonomy as a close objective. However, systemic changes at the global level have rekindled interest in autonomy, making this category a fundamental analysis tool for conducting international studies from Latin America.

Therefore, the general objective of this research is to analyze the role of extra-hemispheric relations in the autonomy of Latin America. The research is part of the Autonomy School since it reflects on the region's ability to influence the Global Order, and it has a Critical perspective on International Relations because it not only does to the analysis of reality, but it is also normative in the sense that it indicates the way for a better insertion of the region in the contemporary Global Order.

The article is presented in two parts: in the first entitled *Latin American autonomy as material (im)possibility*, are analyzed from a historical perspective the main limitations for the Latin America autonomy, especially the sharing Hemisphere with a hegemonic power, and the difficulties of the regional integration process; and then, how in contemporary times global trends such as the decline of power in the United States, and the rise of the Global South, pose a favorable scenario for Latin American autonomy. And in the second part, *Extra-hemispheric relations of Latin America*, are analyzed the Latin America contemporary relations with the countries of other continents, and its capacity to contribute to Latin American autonomy.

2. Latin American autonomy as material (im)possibility

Latin America was born as a region looking for its autonomy. The Spanish colonization process left Latin America with a level of cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity that is unique worldwide; but without connections between the different political units. It was only with the struggle for independence and defensive positions against extra-regional threats that the need for the union was realized, and regional actions were taken for sovereignty and autonomy.

As Briceño (2014) points out, the promotion of regional unity in Hispanic America can be found in the war of independence, where a Hispano-American identity narrative is being conceived which will support regionalization initiatives, being Francisco de Miranda and Simon Bolívar the main actors of this regional unit. During the following decades this common Hispanic American identity was evoked to call for joint actions against external dangers. Already in the 1860s, regional congresses were called against the external threat posed by renewed European intervention, and United State expansionism, giving way to *Latin America*, as opposed to *Saxon*. Brazil joined this narrative late, not so much because of the cultural distance but because of its monarchical form of government; but when it became a Republic in 1889, it became an undisputed part of this Latin America. In the treaties of these congresses, the creation of norms of international law and mechanisms for the solution of conflicts typical of Latin America stands out, which will later become a distinctive tradition of the region, the American international law.

Concern about external threats, and awareness of the need for integration and cooperation among Latin American countries, is going to be a constant to this day. These ideas will be systematically articulated in the pioneering works of the Autonomy School, those of Juan Carlos Puig and Helio Jaguaribe.

For example, Puig (1980: pp. 154-155) points out that it is a primary condition that dependent countries are aware of their situation and overcome isolation, and that their internal development models are consistent and based on strategic solidarity, and then put together their power resources. However, he warns that not all integration is autonomous, that it is fundamentally instrumental, and that its role for autonomist will depend on the objectives that are set. And finally, it suggests that in Latin America there has been no decisive progress in the integration process because its objectives have not been properly autonomous.

Despite the importance of integration and cooperation in Latin America, it remains speculative and fragmented. Latin America is an international society in the sense that it has shared interests, values, and norms; but it does not have common institutions that allow them to negotiate as a bloc with other global actors. Old schemes have been exhausted, and since 2000 multilateral spaces and organizations have proliferated; but these have hindered the aggregation of interests, dispersing efforts.

This has reduced the agency capacity of Latin America and has exacerbated the vulnerability of the region, especially by sharing the hemisphere with the main world power, the United States.

The contemporary international relations of the Latin American countries had as a practically exclusive framework the Western Hemisphere, being its main political and economic tie with the United States.

The United States after the end of the Second World War consolidated itself as the great world hegemon, not only for being victorious from the war, but also for avoiding its physical destruction thanks to its geographical remoteness, and the increase in its production capacity. Thus the United States was unrivaled in the military, economically, or politically. Then, the United States misplaced its hegemon qualities due to the loss of the Vietnam War and its relative economic decline against its allies in Western Europe and Japan. However, even at the beginning of the 21st century, where the United States has lost its hegemonic qualities, it continues to be a main actor in the Global Order, and the international liberal institutions promoted by this country remain fundamental to international governance.

Thus, the strength of the United States' gravitation and the asymmetry of power vis-à-vis Latin America have made the main referents of the region's foreign policies focus on the United States, and that relations with other actors are mediated by the interests of the world power, which additionally considers the region as its natural zone of influence.

Individual or collective Latin American foreign policy towards the United States has oscillated between coupling, limited opposition, defiance, and isolation. From the 1940s to the 1960s, Latin American countries voted virtually as a bloc in multilateral organizations following United States proposals. Even during the so-called cold war, only three countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay; and it was not until the 1980s that Latin America considered more diversified international relations. The countries geographically closest to the United States, such as those of Central America and Mexico, which make up the economic block of the Treaty between Mexico, the

United States, and Canada (T - MEC, formerly NAFTA), are more dependent on economic, commercial, and demographic matters; while Brazil, geographically more distant and with aspirations to be a regional power with global projection, has carried out a more autonomous policy in front the United States (Covarrubias and Domínguez, 2015; Russell and Tokatlian, 2009).

The gravitational pull of the United States limited the diversification of the region's international relations and its autonomy. Even within the Hemisphere itself, relations with Canada have been scarce, as shown, for example, by the late incorporation of this country to the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990, in clear contrast to its vocation for multilateral foreign policy and liberal internationalist.

Historically, Canada's relations with Latin America have been scarce, the intermediate power has always been careful not to have an active policy in this region where the United States has had preponderance. With the Latin American democratization process of the 1980s and with the loss of United State hegemony, Canada's ties with the region increased. Canada joined the OAS in 1990 with the administration of Brian Mulroney of the Progressive Conservative Party, highlighting its role in the consolidation of this organism, its role as a promoter of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), and its search for being a bridge between the United States and Latin America, although this was not accomplished by being generally aligned with United State interests. The most intense ties with Canada have been in economic matters and especially reduced to Mexico for being part of the Treaty between Mexico, the United States, and Canada (T - MEC). As of 2006, with the administration of Stephen Harper of the Conservative Party Canada, he showed greater interest in the region but reduced it to the commercial issue, which departs from the multidimensional tradition of Canadian foreign policy, signing four Free Trade Agreements (FTA), thus reaching seven FTA of the twelve that Canada has; however, trade continues to lack dynamism, only 2 percent of Latin American imports come from Canada, and Latin American exports to Canada only represent 2.5 percent of total exports in the region. Foreign direct investment (FDI) also increased but it was reduced to the mining area (Macdonald, 2018; Appel, 2001).

Despite the arrival of Justin Trudeau from the Liberal Party in 2015, there has been no major change in Canada's foreign policy towards the region. Canada's foreign policy towards Latin America is surely the most deficient of this intermediate power, it departs significantly from its liberal

internationalist tradition that promotes values such as democracy and human rights, and even on narrower exclusively commercial issues when they have been had initiatives have been unsuccessful. This deficiency is deliberate rather than omission, due to not wanting to compromise in the zone of United State preponderance.

Canada has significant legitimacy in multilateral spaces, so if it played a more independent role from the United States, it could contribute to hemispheric governance of mutual benefits. The asymmetric relations that exist between Saxon America and Latin America are essential to developing within a framework of institutionalized multilateralism.

The fundamental premise of Latin American autonomy is to have a more diversified agenda of hemispheric affairs. Latin America has a significant asymmetric interdependence with the United States, in demographic, migratory, commercial, and security matters associated with drug trafficking. All of these issues have been addressed giving priority to United States interests, so a multilateral treatment of these issues where Canada can offer creative solutions, and that all actors benefit, would be fundamental to the agency capacity of Latin America.

The Organization of American States (OAS) remains, despite its limitations, the best space for this. The OAS is one of the most resilient institutions worldwide, and continues to be the main hemispheric political forum; its strengthening depends on the support and executive capacity given by member countries. Although autonomy has historically been linked to the legalistic conception of sovereignty, in modern times the highly esteemed objectives such as democracy, human rights and autonomy demand from multilateral organizations committed to the responsibility to protect, which does not pose a threat to sovereignty, on the contrary, remember that sovereignty falls on the citizens and not on the government.

United States' power, and its absolute and relative decline in contemporaneity, has not only influenced the Hemisphere, but it has also significantly influenced the Global Order, which is of special importance for the autonomist aspirations of Latin America.

Nye (2011a, 2011b, 2003) affirms that in the contemporary Global Order power is distributed in the form of three-dimensional chess, where there is an upper board corresponding to classical military affairs, an intermediate board referring to economics, and finally, the lower board where transnational affairs are developed. The United States on the top board continues to be the hegemon with no competition in sight, on the economic board it increasingly loses more space with the emergence of countries like

China, and on the bottom board it has less and less control over terrorists, traffickers of weapons and drugs, hackers, among other matters.

This decline in US power has been accompanied by greater international gravitation and a greater economic preponderance of actors from the Global South, including some from Latin America. Contemporary economic globalization was primarily driven by England and the United States, but these contemporary countries are focused on their internal problems and reject the openness policies they previously promoted; England with its Brexit process, and the United States with protectionism and clauses, and Donald Trump's anti-Chinese commercials. So, the Global South has also taken a greater role in global governance and institutions.

The UNDP annual report (2013) entitled *The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*, noting that one of the main phenomena of the international economy is the improvement of human development in many countries of the South. For 2011, international trade represented close to 60 percent of global production; the Global South went from contributing to this international trade from 25 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 2010; trade within the Global South increased from less than 8 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 2011; South-South investment has also increased, reaching 60 percent of all foreign investment received in the South. For the first time in a hundred and fifty years, the combination of the GDP of three economies in the Global South, such as China, India, and Brazil, equals the set of the main Northern economies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Canada. This contemporary rise of the Global South for its scale and speed is unprecedented in history, for example, the Industrial Revolution doubled GDP per capita in one hundred and fifty years in Great Britain, in the United States it took fifty years, and both countries had a population of less than ten million; while China and India doubled their GDP per capita in twenty years with populations around one billion, and their share in world production went from 33 percent to 45 percent. More than 100 countries in the Global South recorded growth in per capita income of more than 3 percent in 2007.

Therefore, a continuous displacement of the economic centers is observed from the North Atlantic to the Global South. These material changes can be the basis not only for the change of the International Political Economy and its institutions, but also for a transformation of global political institutions, global governance, and the international agenda; where the objectives of the Global South, including those of autonomy of Latin America, have a better representation.

These dynamics, and the greater vertiginous and complexity of the contemporary challenges of the Global Order, have promoted global governance through *clubs*, which seeks to provide answers to specific problems through the cooperation of non-traditional multilateralism; where the G-20 stands out, since here the Emerging countries, including Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina from Latin America, can horizontally define with the countries of historical systemic importance the responses to the main contemporary issues. The approach to the main challenges of the contemporary Global Order needs the mobilization of material resources and the legitimacy of the Global South countries. Although the G20 gained greater prominence after the 2008 global financial crisis, and this issue monopolized the agenda, it has broadened its themes to the interests of emerging countries (Rinke and Schneckener, 2012; Beeson and Bell, 2009).

However, in this situation the problems of regional fragmentation are also evident as the main element to influence the international agenda; for example, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina have diverged in different matters within the group, such as the issue of economic liberalization. Additionally, they have not assumed positions of regional representation and have not shown a greater commitment to issues of interest to Latin America or the Global South. Therefore, the substantive aspect of autonomy is not the increase in the number of participants in global governance groups, but rather that they can generate significant changes in the international agenda.

In this context Acharya (2018) defines the contemporary Global Order as a *multi-complex*, where political and cultural diversity is more evident, the actors are more deeply interconnected and interdependent, different actors and levels of government overlap, power is decentralized in the sense of that, even though asymmetries and hierarchies continue to exist, there is no global hegemony. Actors such as international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and transnational networks have greater influence; the global agenda is pluralized, and especially, the agency capacity of all actors is pluralized, which is especially strategic for Latin American countries.

Especially important for Latin America and its international relations is what Acharya (2014) observes of this multi-complex world, referring to the greater importance that regionalisms and the regional order take, since the emerging powers of the Global South are presented as regional powers, and the weaker countries have a better agency capacity at this scale; creating conditions for regional powers with aspirations to project their power globally to legitimize themselves locally, which is an incentive to offer public goods and a more constructive relationship in general. Besides, the global

powers have greater limits to impose their interests in this scenario of more developed regionalisms.

In this context, Latin America is presented as a region that shares interests, values, and norms, where democracy has been established in almost all countries, which resolves their interstate differences peacefully, with a legalistic culture that like no other region in the world, that has promoted a prolific number of multilateral treaties, conventions, and resolutions, which maintains its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which does not pose a threat to international security, which grows economically and reduces poverty. These qualities make Latin America not a focus of attention in traditional terms of international relations, but it allows it to have a more diverse foreign policy, in themes and regions.

3. Extra-hemispheric relations of Latin America

Latin America since the 1980s had more dynamic relationships with extra-hemispheric actors but practically reduced exclusively to the main allies of the United States, Europe, and Japan. An even relation with the other great world power, the Soviet Union (USSR), was scarce compared to those assumed by this power in Africa and reduced to Cuba in the Caribbean. This dynamic will change in recent years, and Europe and Japan will gradually lose preponderance in Latin America's international relations vis-à-vis other extra-hemispheric actors.

Latin America historically has not been a priority for European foreign policy. Despite the shared values and the synchronization of some political processes such as the democratization of Southern Europe and the Latin American Southern Cone, the main priorities of Europe have been focused on its Eastern and Mediterranean borders, within the framework of its Policy of Neighborhood, the relationship with the United States and other global powers, and its relationship with the former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific within the Cotonou Convention.

When the European Community began to expand in the 1970s, the first collective relations with Latin America began; but it is in the 1980s with the democratization process of Spain and Portugal, that Venezuela supported politically and economically, that these countries would join to the European Union (EU) in 1986, and Latin America became more important on Europe's external affairs agenda. Starting in the 1990s, bi-regional summits were held regularly, one of the main initiatives being the bi-annual summits between the EU and the Community of Latin American

and Caribbean States (CELAC, for its initials in Spanish), which have generated greater institutionalization but no real content; additionally, they lost their political relevance and even the meeting corresponding to the year 2017 has not been held. The current relations are characterized by bilateralism at the individual country level, where Mexico and Brazil stand out, and on the European side Spain, which continues to be an important investor in the region and import destination of Latin American products, but in both roles, it has decreased. Historically, relations between Europe and Latin America have focused on trade issues, the opening and privatizations carried out in Latin America in the 1980s, allowed the European Union to position itself as the main investor in the region, and the second-largest trading partner, only surpassed by the United States. However, in the 2000s Europe has lost absolute and relative spaces in the economy of Latin America (Ayuso, 2019; Gratius, 2015; Chanona, 2004; Sotillo, 2013; Muñoz, 2004).

Currently, this trend of loss of importance is accentuated due to the Brexit process, the rebellion of the Visegrad group, the proliferation of xenophobic neo-conservatism that limit foreign policy on issues and geographically, the polarizations that prevent the development of a common foreign policy, and the loss of influence of the countries that traditionally for historical reasons have given more importance to Latin America, Spain, and Portugal. On the Latin American side, the inability to maintain common positions in foreign policy has also hindered relations, as evidenced by the fragmentation and decline of CELAC, which was just created in 2011.

On the other hand, Japan is a world economic power; through the 1980s it had a very high economic growth that positioned it as a global player. And this coincided with the democratization process in Latin America, which gave commercial and investment dynamism to Japanese-Latin American relations. Japan participates in forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and the Latin America-East Asia Cooperation Forum (FEALAC); it has signed Economic Association Agreements, the first being those of Mexico (2005) and Chile (2007). The principal recipients of Japanese exports are Mexico, and with a difference of less than half, in second place, Brazil, and Latin America, in general, concentrates its exports to Japan in natural resources. However, trade and investment relations have increased absolutely, but their relative importance has decreased, as the slowdown in the economy in recent years has led Japan to have a more modest foreign policy and to lose relative weight in the economy worldwide, especially in Latin America (Murakami, 2017).

Besides, Japan invests more resources in addressing a complex immediate environment, which includes the strengthening of China as a regional hegemon with geopolitical ambitions, North Korea's aggressive policies, and unresolved issues with South Korea derived from the colonial past.

Japan's foreign policy has as a priority to strengthen the alliance with the United States, its principal economic and security partners. Therefore, the Japanese approach to Latin America, a region that the United States considers its zone of influence, is conditioned and limited in terms of topics and depth. Consequently, even though Latin America has the largest Nikkei community in the world, the recent increase in diplomatic intensity, the more presence of the Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in the region, and his proposals to "Lead Together" and "Inspire Together"; Japan's foreign policy towards Latin America is still reactive, without continuity and less intense (Murakami, 2017; Yamaoka, 2015).

In contrast to this space left by traditional extra-hemispheric actors, other extra-hemispheric actors have a greater influence in Latin America, especially China.

China's foreign policy towards Latin America in the contemporary world can be characterized as pragmatic and sustained. China shows no interest in exporting its own political or social model, and while countries with leftist governments have shown the greatest rhetorical interest in these relations, right-wing governments or changes in ideological signs, have not affected relations with the Asian power. Additionally, despite the asymmetry of power in Sino-Latin American relations, China's practices, and policies that on several occasions have not respected international and national regulations, and China's interest in having a greater weight in the international system, the region has not yet developed an anti-hegemonic sentiment towards China.

China - Latin America relations during the 1970s and 1980s became more relevant. Deng Xiaoping expounded in the United Nations the theory of the Three Worlds of Mao, in 1978 the *policies of reform* and *openness* were applied in China, which transformed the country in economic and social aspects. Many of the Latin American countries established diplomatic relations with China, and trade and economic agreements were signed with more than ten countries in the region, bilateral trade and economic cooperation increased. In the 1990s, China attended the annual meetings of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as an observer and since

2009 became the first extra-regional member of this institution. China is an observer member of the Latin American Integration Association (Aladi), maintains frequent contacts with the Latin American Parliament, and with the Latin American Economic System (Sela). Currently, the growing importance of Sino-Latin American ties stands out, especially evidenced by the publication of the first Chinese foreign policy document for the region in 2008, and by the 2015-2019 cooperation framework proposed by Xi Jinping in 2014 during the first summit of leaders from China and Latin America and the Caribbean held in Brazil. Cultural and diplomatic relations have also been expanded, for example, through the opening of the Confucius Cultural Institutes, through intense and traveling diplomacy, and through cooperation in areas of education and services (Shicheng, 2003, Berjano, 2019; Chen and Li, 2017; Detsch, 2018; Rios, 2018).

A topic of special importance for Chinese foreign policy worldwide and in particular for Latin America, is the issue of recognition of Taiwan. China has achieved that in the last two years El Salvador in 2018 and Panama in 2017 break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but of the fifteen states that still recognize Taiwan, five are from the Caribbean and four from Latin America, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.

Sino-Latin American relations are becoming deeper and more multifaceted, and it is one of the few extra-hemispheric relations that have been more proactive than reactive.

In economic matters, the most significant project worldwide is the one promoted by China called the *Belt and Road Initiative*, which is of strategic importance for Latin America and has significant complementarities and spaces for cooperation. China has a special interest in guaranteeing access to the region's natural resources, and Latin America by attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in strategic areas such as infrastructure and communication, which would include bi-oceanic rail links and tunnels. Latin America must achieve that these infrastructures generate employment and productive chains. This is a unique opportunity for the development of the region.

China is already the second-largest investing country in the region, and Latin America is the second receiving region for Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), contributing around 15 percent of total FDI, with 80 percent of an investment concentrated in Brazil, Peru, and Argentina. China has become the leading banker in Latin America, the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank have outperformed the region to the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and their

loans are characterized by repayment possibilities to long-term, and are not conditioned by economic policies unlike those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The loans accumulated in the period 2005 - 2017 have reached 150 billion dollars (MMDD), highlighting those received by Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina. Additionally, a diversified set of cooperation mechanisms have been created such as the Infrastructure Fund, the Special Fund for Agriculture, and the Scientific-Technological Association Program. It should also be noted that more than two thousand Chinese companies have been founded in Latin America; if in the first instance they focused on the purchase of raw materials, and agricultural products, they have also expanded to sectors such as the automotive industry, e-commerce, and technology businesses (Berjano, 2019; Rios, 2018; Gallagher and Myers, 2017; Chen and Li, 2017; Detsch, 2018).

Sino-Latin American bilateral trade in 2017 totaled 257.8 MMDD, the exports to China were 130.8 MMDD and imports from China, 127 MMDD. China currently has three Free Trade Agreements with countries in the region, with Chile since 2005, with Peru since 2009, and with Costa Rica in 2011. China is today the first trading partner of Brazil, Chile, and Peru; and the second from most countries in the region. Trade with China remains raw materials, practically exclusively energy and mining, for manufacturing, but the Belt and Road Initiative and the development of Chinese companies in the region can change this trend. China's rise in the world economy has also affected the terms of trade, the increase in the prices of raw materials and energy resources, and the reduction in the prices of manufactures, have had diametrically different effects in the Latin American sub-regions. While South America presented a productive structure of complementarity with China and presented a trade surplus; Mexico and Central America presented a structure of competitiveness and maintained trade deficits. South America has benefited from the high demand for raw materials and energy products, and the high supply of manufactures, which has improved the terms of trade; while Mexico and Central America have shown deterioration in the terms of trade for this same situation since they are net importers of oil and net exporters of manufacturing. Additionally, Mexico was surpassed by China as the second commercial partner of the United States, especially due to the displacement of Mexican and Central American manufacturing (Berjano, 2019; Detsch, 2018; Rios, 2018; Gallagher and Myers, 2017; Chen and Li, 2017; Rosales and Kuwayama, 2007; Caputo, 2005; CEPAL, 2004).

Latin America must develop true economic diplomacy until now diplomatic efforts have been reduced to accompany the logic of the market.

Economic diplomacy must promote projects that allow the incorporation of Latin American economies into Asian production chains, but not only as suppliers of raw materials, but also to identify the activities with the highest added value, and that promote investment and technological alliances. Otherwise, the logic of the market and the re-primarization of Latin American economies will continue to prevail.

India is the other great Asian power. Since the process of independence, India had a foreign policy based mainly on values shared by the Global South, but since 1991, with the applied economic reforms, it began to have greater material capacities and to deploy a more ambitious and pragmatic foreign policy. India reached out to western powers, especially the United States, but also maintained geographic priorities, which are its main historical continuum of foreign policy. The priorities of Indian foreign policy are in the first instance its immediate neighbors to South Asia, then those of the Indian Ocean Basin, and other sub-regions of Asia such as Southeast Asia, Western Asia, and Central Asia, and finally the third includes topics such as international security and strategic partners like the United States and Russia (Heine and Seshasayee, 2019; Narain, 2010).

Thus, Latin America has not been a priority for India's foreign policy, neither historically or in the contemporary world. Of the India - Latin America relations, the bilateral India-Brazil stands out, characterized by long-standing diplomatic missions, frequent high-level visits, multilateral participation through the BRICS, IBSA, and G-20 forums, a preferential trade agreement, and great mutual investments. (Heine and Seshasayee, 2019).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made Indian foreign policy one of his priorities and a much more dynamic one, making India one of the most visible world powers; however, as can be seen from his few visits to Latin America, even compared to his counterpart Xi Jinping and senior Chinese officials, Latin America remains the major absentee from Indian foreign policy. The most significant advances in India-Latin America relations have been reduced to the commercial issue.

After the 1990s trade relations were revitalized, India's trade with Latin America went from 2 MMDD in the early 2000s to a maximum of 49 MMDD in 2014; this year it ranked third in the most important export markets in Latin America, second only to the United States and China. Only in 2017 did it lose this position, placed it in fourth place, due to the drop in oil prices. India also has strategic associations with Brazil and Mexico; and it has trade agreements with Chile and with Mercosur. Like China, it

has the largest investments in the oil sector, especially in Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia (Heine and Seshasayee, 2019).

India - Latin America relations are emerging as one of the greatest potentials for geographic and agenda diversification in Latin American international relations. India is one of the fastest-growing global markets, with an increasingly active foreign policy, with a demographic weight that will make it the most populated country in the world, and with shared values such as democracy and multilateralism. But it is also where there is a wider gap between potentiality and effectiveness, which is why India must be a priority of Latin American foreign policy.

Another Asian country that has increased its weight in the contemporary Global Order is South Korea. South Korea as an intermediate power has also shown greater interest in Latin America, during the period known in South Korea as the Third Republic (1961 - 1972) relations with Latin America began, but was scarce and concentrated almost exclusively on the efforts of the South Korean government of General Park Chung Hee for the region recognition of the Seoul government as the legitimate representative of Korea. In the 1990s and 2000s, after the democratization process of South Korea and the countries of the Latin American Southern Cone, South Korean presidents toured South America, Kim Young-Sam (1996), Roh Moo-Hyun (2004), Lee Myung-Bak (2008), and Park Geun-hye (2015). Especially significant in commercial matters are the last two, as they occurred within the framework of business diplomacy, allowing Latin America to be part of the South Korean global investment plan, being the main destinations Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, who was the first to sign a free trade agreement with this Asian country. The Pacific basin, especially Mexico, Peru, and Colombia, have also been incorporated into South Korean interests (Anderson, 2016).

Latin America has also intensified its international relations with other intermediate powers such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran, which have sought to diversify their relations after receiving international sanctions and blockades. These countries have been characterized by not being democratic, and especially Iran, by systematically violating human rights. However, historical and contemporary empirical evidence advises that isolationism policies have not produced positive results for the promotion of human rights or democracy. So, maintaining relations with these countries not only contributes to the diversification of Latin American relations but can also serve as space for dialogue to promote the values of the high appreciation to the international community.

Russia since the beginning of the 21st century with the presidential administration of Vladimir Putin has sought to regain its role as a world power. Although, Latin America has increased in importance in this scenario, it is still not a priority for Russian foreign policy. The importance of Latin America for Russia is geopolitical; they are western countries that are within what the United States considers its area of influence, and strategic partners in increasingly recurring scenarios of detente policy, and commercial economic blockades. Latin America did not support the blockade made to Russia by the North-Atlantic countries, the volume of Russian-Latin American trade so far in the 21st century has been increasing but with oscillations, for the year 2000 trade reached 5.5 MMDD, the maximum level was reached in 2013 with almost 19 MMDD, and for 2017 14.4 MMDD, being its main commercial partner Brazil, and the main export products to Russia the agro-industrial ones. The presence of Russian companies in Latin America has also increased, especially in the hydrocarbon and defense sectors (Davydov, 2019; Davydov, 2010).

Turkey is another middle power with global aspirations. Since the 2000s, Turkish foreign policy has expanded geographically and thematically: This has been due to the lack of progress in the negotiations to be included in the European Union; to its economic dynamism, which was relatively strengthened following the economic and financial crisis of 2008; and finally, to the coming to power of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the conservative Justice and Development Party (*Adaletve Kalkınma Partisi*, JDP), who has had a greater interest in projecting Turkey globally. Thus, Latin America is posed as a region where Turkey can diversify its international relations and demonstrate its capacity as a global power. To that end, Turkey declared 2006 as “the Year of Latin America and the Caribbean” and introduced the second “Latin America Action Plan”, giving way to an increase in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives, trade volume, and cultural and educational exchanges (Önsoy, 2017).

Iran - Latin America relations found a positive scenario for cooperation since the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, which allowed for greater pragmatism of foreign policy to Latin America, and with the end of the Second Gulf War, and the policy of distension of Iran with its neighbors. In the early 2000s, an anti-war solidarity movement emerged due to the unilateral attack by the United States after the September 11 terrorist attack, while the Iranian president was the reformist Mohammad Khatami, who, due to his reformist credentials, had strengthened relations with countries such Mexico and Brazil. During the administrations of Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Hasan Rohaní, relations between Iran and Latin

America intensified with the increase in presidential visits and the signing of agreements, especially with countries that share anti-hegemonic rhetoric such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, but also with Brazil, which in addition to its commercial relations, has acted as a mediator on the Iranian nuclear issue (Mousavi, 2009).

It should also be noted that relations with Venezuela have a long history and greater depth, since the co-founding of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), one of the original and most resilient institutions of the Global South, for which these relations made the region especially sensitive to the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

These Latin American multiple belongings relationships have the potential to increase their agency capacity in the international order; but for this potential to become effective, a relevant foreign policy is necessary to harmonize these relationships with the traditional objectives and values of the region, and that they are more proactive than reactive to the contemporary Global Order.

In the relations between the Arab World and Latin America, the meetings held since 2000 to promote scientific cooperation and cultural exchange stand out in multilateral matters; and in 2005 the South America - Arab Countries Summit (ASPA), which brings together UNASUR and the Arab League, met for the first time. In political matters, for the Arab World, and the dignity and justice of the countries of the Global South in general, the case of Palestine is fundamental. Most of the countries of South America have recognized the Palestinian State with the notable exception of Colombia, the main partner of the United States in the sub-region, while the majority in Central America has not, leaving in evidence the influence that the United States has in the foreign policy of this sub-region. Also in political matters, it should be noted that the 2003 the United State invasion of Iraq received the support of almost all of the Central American countries and four sent troops, while in South America only Colombia supported it but without sending troops. In Human Rights issues, the Latin American governments, except Chile and Colombia, did not condemn the violation of that repressed the so-called Arab Spring of 2010. In commercial matters, transactions are still scarce, but they have tripled in recent years, showing special dynamism in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait; and by Latin America, Brazil, which exports agricultural products but also high-tech manufactures such as airplanes, from the Embraer company (Kahhat, 2011; Funk, 2016; Tawil, 2016).

The case of Venezuela also stands out here due to the complexity of relations with the Arab World, in the context of the co-founding of OPEC together with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and with the subsequent incorporation of Libya in 1962, the United Arab Emirates in 1967, and Algeria in 1969.

The generality of Latin America does not have a systematic foreign policy towards the Arab World; the lack of recognition of the Palestinian State, and the lack of solidarity in the main political events by the Central American countries, is a sign of the deficiency of autonomy of their policy abroad, and an impediment to having better relations with the Arab countries. The Arab World is a significant epicenter of the contemporary Global Order, and the recognition of the State of Palestine is an ethical and political priority of the Global South and is additionally attached to International Law. For Latin America to have a greater weight in international affairs and greater effectiveness in global governance, it must have a better approach to this region.

Finally, in relations between Africa and Latin America, since the independence of the African States, relations have been strengthened through high-level mutual visits, increased trade, and scientific-technical cooperation. Brazil, due to its material and cultural resources, maintained full contact with Africa during its colonial period and has led Africa-Latin America relations. From the beginning of the 1960s, with the presidency of Janio Quadros and his *independent* foreign policy, foreign policy towards Africa was implemented; and with the arrival of Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva, African policy was resumed and reinforced through a process of intense rapprochement diplomatic and commercial relations. During these periods cooperation was promoted with the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) which includes the creation in 2010 of the Integration University Afro-Brazilian Lusophony International (UNILAB) in the city of Redenção, and with the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZPCAS). In multilateral matters, initiatives such as the IBSA forum and the South America-Africa Summit (ASA) were promoted; and in bilateral material, ties were strengthened especially with democratic South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola (Lechini, 2014; Mourão, 1994; Saraiva, 1996).

Venezuela also maintains more complex relations within the OPEC framework with the African member countries, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and the Republic of the Congo.

One of the weaknesses that can be identified in Africa - Latin America relations is its limited financial sustainability. Cooperation projects, high-level exchanges, and institutions, need economic resources, and only Brazil has had the vocation to finance these projects. Its African counterpart with the largest resources South Africa has as its almost exclusive foreign policy priority its continental African space and in extra-regional matters its relationship with world powers, and its presence as an African interlocutor in multilateral organizations and groups. This shortage of resources is evident, for example, in the low density of the presence of diplomatic missions.

4. Conclusions

The *different* autonomies, by relationship, by integration, and by diversification are interdependent. Although Latin America has geographically diversified its international relations, with extra-hemispheric relations having a new dynamism, they have had a limited impact on the autonomy of the region and its influence on global governance, since its agency capacity remains limited by resource asymmetries compared to other global actors. This is due to the lack of coordination of a minimum Latin American Common Foreign Policy (CFP) that harmonizes shared interests and allows it to interact en bloc in the Global Order.

Although some actors stand out individually, such as Brazil, the region as a whole still does not achieve its autonomy and maintains its marginal position in the Global Order. If Brazil as an intermediate power wants to have greater weight, its aspirations depend to lead the integration process and its ability to offer regional public goods.

An effective diversification of Latin American relations with non-hemispheric actors would also allow for greater autonomy at the continental level since it would give greater weight and greater elements of the agency to influence hemispheric affairs.

Latin America is not the foreign policy priority of any power or region, including that of extra-hemispheric actors. It is observed that relations with China are the most significant and those with the greatest dynamism perspective, relations with India are those that show the greatest gap between potentiality and effective relations, relations with intermediate powers pose a major challenge for the consolidation of a region with multiple belongings, relations with the Arab World need greater political will and a successful rapprochement on its key issues, and relations with Africa depend on a financial and political commitment that remains weak. Strategies specially designed for each region are needed.

Historically, Latin America's international relations have been mediated by the United States, but the relative and absolute decline of its influence poses a positive scenario for the looking for autonomy in the region. Thus, the conditions of the Global Order are privileged for the autonomy of the region; but intraregional conditions still have to be met, the capacity of the countries of Latin America to integrate and consolidate a Common Foreign Policy (CFP).

Latin America does not exist as a political unit, its integration and regionalization remain weak. The divergence of contemporary political and economic models makes it difficult to consolidate this Common Foreign Policy (CFP), coupled with the global phenomenon of personalization of foreign policy. Therefore, the professionalization and institutionalization of foreign policy that consolidates a State policy and not only a government one, is a common challenge for all the countries of the world, especially pressing for Latin America.

The main element that will allow the autonomy of Latin America is the coordination capacity that the countries have to harmonize their interest. The limitations are financial and organizational. Consolidating a minimum common mechanism of Latin American foreign policy is essential to promote autonomous hemispheric and extra-hemispheric relations. Each country has its interest, but the major issues of social esteem of the contemporary Global Order such as development, human rights, and democracy pose a significant interdependence between the countries of the region and the region with the world. Bilateral and multilateral meeting spaces have increased, but Latin American integration with a regional vocation remains an objective to be met.

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